



Spectrum Auctions

BCBC May 2019

Outline



- Auction Goals
- Sealed-Bid Auctions
- SMRA (Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending) Auctions
- CCA (Combinatorial Clock) Auctions
- Spectrum Valuation Outcomes

Auction Goals



- Get the highest price
- Sell everything quickly
- Discover the "right" price
- Display of fairness
- Further a policy goal

Sealed-Bid Auction



- aka "Silent Auction"
- Used for residual licences
- One secret bid per bidder
- First-price or second-price

SMRA Auction



- Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending
- Multiple products (ex. licences)
- All auctioned at the same time
- At each round, auctioneer announces prices for each product
- If there is more than one bid for each product, the price is incremented
- Auction ends when supply = demand

Opening Bids



- Recent 600 MHz auction
- Service Area 2-03 British Columbia
- Pop 4,647,973
- 520 Eligibility Points
- Opening bid for 10 MHz @
 \$0.539/MHz/pop = \$25,053,000

Opening Bids



- 600 MHz auction \$/MHz/pop
 - \$0.133 North
 - \$0.360 Rural
 - \$0.539 AB / BC / East ON
 - \$0.804 South ON / South QC

Opening Bids



- 2 GHz AWS-3 auction (2015) \$/MHz/pop
 - \$0.05 North
 - \$0.06 NL, NS, NB, SK
 - \$0.08 East QC, East ON
 - \$0.09 MN, AB
 - \$0.10 BC
 - \$0.11 South ON
 - \$0.12 South QC


SMRA - Activity Rules



- Each licence is assigned an opening price and eligibility points
- Initial deposit is opening price (\$/point)
- Bidder's initial eligibility equals the points of the deposit
- Each bid has an associated number of eligibility points
- Bidder's eligibility is reduced as bids are reduced

Revealed Preference Rule






Points parking

Orphan Licences



Upper Trout Lake



Combinatorial Clock Auction



- Bid on packages, not individual licences
- Like products are grouped
- Three stages
 - Clock Rounds
 - Supplementary Round
 - Assignment Round

Supplementary Rounds



Final Clock Round Package \$10M






Alternate Package \$8M





Alternate Package \$6.5M







- All participants may enter supplementary bid packages for different combinations, different prices
- Each bid cannot exceed eligibility
- Winning combinations are solved to maximize total value

Vickrey Price



- Vickrey price is an extension of second price to multiple products and combinations
- With multiple products, this is an algorithm that solves for the price such that no other bidders would pay more.
- Winning bids announced as packages.

Assignment Rounds



- Opportunity to express value of particular items within category
- Contiguous spectrum in a licence area
- Same spectrum in adjacent licence areas

2015 AWS Auction



Licence Winner	Supp. Bids	Licences Won	Vickery Price Paid (\$M)	Final Clock Price (\$M)	Vickery / Clock
Bell	501	51	\$28.99	\$76.97	0.38
Eastlink	20	11	\$4.82	\$12.09	0.40
CCI	503	13	\$2.30	\$13.78	0.17
MTS	19	2	\$2.24	\$2.61	0.86
Rogers	195	41	\$24.09	\$73.49	0.33
TBayTel	5	2	\$1.73	\$1.73	1.00
TELUS	28	122	\$478.82	\$1,038.47	0.46
Vidéotron	6	18	\$186.95	\$440.05	0.42
Xplornet	29	42	\$25.44	\$64.39	0.40



- 700 MHz auction (2014)
 - \$0.30 to \$13 /MHz/pop
 - Most \$1.50 to \$3.50 /MHz/pop

- Community of 20,000
- 20 MHz of spectrum
- @ \$2.50/MHz/pop

\$1,000,000



- 2500 MHz BRS auction (2015)
 - Most < \$1.00 /MHz/pop
 - Tier-3 service areas
 - Not all licences available
- Community of 20,000
- 20 MHz of spectrum
- @ \$1.00/MHz/pop

\$400,000



- AWS-3 auction (2015) CCA format
 - About \$0.20-\$0.30 /MHz/pop for setaside spectrum
 - About \$4 to \$10 /MHz/pop for open spectrum
- Community of 20,000
- 20 MHz of spectrum
- © \$0.25/MHz/pop

\$100,000



- 600 MHz auction (2019) CCA format
 - About \$0.35-\$1.00 /MHz/pop for setaside spectrum
 - About \$2/MHz/pop for open spectrum
 - Bell did not win any spectrum
- Community of 20,000
- 20 MHz of spectrum
- @ \$0.50/MHz/pop

\$200,000

Looking Ahead



- 600 MHz auction full data
- Tier-5 service areas
- ISED consideration of rural service
- 3 GHz spectrum plan and auction

